Introduction.
There is a long line of research, originating in the seminal work of Wald [29, 30] , connecting admissibility and Bayes optimality. For finite parameters spaces, one can use intuitive geometric arguments to establish that every admissible decision procedure is Bayes (see, e.g., [10, §2.10 Thm. 1]). In the other direction, elementary arguments show that every procedure that is Bayes with respect to a prior with full support is admissible [10, §2.3 Thms. 2 and 3] . This close relationship between admissibility and Bayes optimality already breaks down for finite-dimensional parameter spaces: Here, admissible decision procedures are, in general, not Bayes procedures (see, e.g., Stein [27, §4] ). Under some regularity conditions, however, every admissible procedure is a limit of Bayes procedures [6, 16, 31] , although, limits of Bayes procedures are in general neither admissible nor Bayes, as famously demonstrated by Stein [27] in the multivariate normal location model (see also [13] ). Under more stringent conditions, admissible procedures are generalized Bayes [3, 5, 23, 28] , i.e., procedures derived from the mechanicalalso known as formal-application of Bayes rule with respect to improper priors. In both cases, we must leave the strict confines of the Bayesian formalism to reëstablish the link between admissibility and Bayes optimality. The price paid for abandoning the standard Bayesian framework-namely, nonconglomerability and its side effects, including marginalization paradoxes-is the subject of an extensive literature (see, e.g., [9, 24, 25] ).
Here we take a different approach, working within the standard Bayesian theory but carrying out that work in an unusual setting. In particular, we rely on results in mathematical logic that establish the existence of nonstandard models of the reals satisfying three principles: extension, which associates every ordinary mathematical object with a nonstandard counterpart called its extension; transfer, which permits us to use first order logic to relate standard and nonstandard structures; and satura-tion, which gives us a powerful mechanism for proving the existence of nonstandard structures defined in terms of finitely satisfiable collections of first order formula.
Informally speaking, the utility of nonstandard models for statistical decision theory stems from two sources: First, every nonstandard model possesses nonstandard reals numbers, including infinitesimal / infinite positive real numbers that are, respectively, smaller than / larger than any standard positive real number. Using such numbers, we can, e.g., construct uniform probability measures over infinite intervals that contain the entire standard real line, or construct probability measures on the positive real line concentrating all their mass on a positive infinitesimal. As priors, these structures can be used as extreme statements of uncertainty that do not correspond to any standard prior. Second, standard real numbers look discrete in a nonstandard model. Indeed, in a suitably saturated model of the reals, the standard reals are contained within a hyperfinite set, i.e., an infinite set that nonetheless possesses all the first order properties of a standard finite set.
Using nonstandard analysis and probability theory, we are able to reëstablish the link between admissibility and Bayesian optimality without regularity conditions. In particular, using a separating hyperplane argument in concert with the three principles outline above, we show that a standard decision procedure δ is extended admissible if and only if, for some nonstandard prior, the Bayes risk of its extension * δ is within an infinitesimal of the minimum Bayes risk among all extensions. Such a decision procedure is said to be nonstandard Bayes. Assuming Θ is a metric space and risk functions are continuous, we are able to show that a procedure is admissible if its extension is nonstandard Bayes with respect to a prior that assigns sufficient mass to every standard open ball. The result is a nonstandard variant of Blyth's method, but a single nonstandard prior witnesses the admissibility, rather than a sequence. We also apply our nonstandard theory to give a standard result: on compact Hausdorff spaces when risk functions are continuous, a decision procedure is extended admissible if and only if is Bayes.
1.1. Overview of the paper. In Section 2, we introduce basic notions and key results in standard statistical decision theory: domination, admissibility, and its variants; Bayes optimality; and basic complete class and essentially complete class results. (Classic treatments can be found in [10] and [4] , the latter emphasizing the connection with game theory, but restricting itself to finite discrete spaces. A modern treatment can be found in [17] .) In Section 3, we follow this introduction of basic principles with a summary of the extensive literature on complete class theorems.
In Section 4, we define nonstandard counterparts of admissibility, extended admissibility, and essential completeness, which we obtain by ignoring infinitesimal violations of the standard notions, and then give key theorems relating standard and nonstandard notions for standard decision procedures and their nonstandard extensions, respectively. For readers unfamiliar with nonstandard analysis and probability, we summarize basic notions and key results in Appendices A and B.
In Section 5, we define the nonstandard counterpart to Bayes optimality, which
we also obtain by ignoring infinitesimal violations of the standard notion. Using saturation and a hyperfinite version of the classical separating hyperplane argument on a hyperfinite discretization of the risk set, we show that a decision procedure is extended admissible if and only if it its extension is nonstandard Bayes. In Section 6, we apply the nonstandard theory to obtain a standard result: assuming the parameter space is compact and risk functions are continuous, a decision procedure is extended admissible if and only if it is Bayes.
In Section 7, we employ the results of the previous section to connect admissibility and nonstandard Bayes optimality under various regularity conditions on the space and the nonstandard prior. In the process, we give a nonstandard variant of Blyth's method.
In Section 8, we study several simple statistical decision problems to highlight the nonstandard theory and its connections to the standard theory.
In Section 9, we list some open problems.
Standard preliminaries.
A (nonsequential) statistical decision problem is defined in terms of a parameter space Θ, each element of which represents a possible state of nature; a set A of actions available to the statistician; a function ℓ : Θ × A → R ≥0 characterizing the loss associated with taking action a ∈ A in state θ ∈ Θ; and finally, a family P = (P θ ) θ ∈Θ of probability measures on a measurable sample space X . On the basis of an observation from P θ for some unknown element θ ∈ Θ, the statistician decides to take a (potentially randomized) action a, and then suffers the loss ℓ(θ , a).
Formally, having fixed a σ -algebra on the space A of actions, every possible response by the statistician is captured by a (randomized) decision procedure, i.e., a map δ from X to the space M 1 (A) of probability measures A. As is customary, we will write δ (x, A) for (δ (x))(A). The expected loss, or risk, to the statistician in state θ associated with following a decision procedure δ is r δ (θ ) = r(θ , δ ) = X A ℓ(θ , a)δ (x, da) P θ (dx). (2.1) For the risk function to be well-defined, the maps x → A ℓ(θ , a)δ (x, da), for θ ∈ Θ, must be measurable, and so we will restrict our attention to those decision procedures satisfying this weak measurability criterion. A decision procedure δ is said to have finite risk if r δ (θ ) ∈ R for all θ ∈ Θ. Let D denote the set of randomized decision procedures with finite risk.
The set D may be viewed as a convex subset of a vector space. In particular, for all δ 1 , . . . , δ n ∈ D and p 1 , . . ., p n ∈ R ≥0 with ∑ i p i = 1, define ∑ i p i δ i : X → M 1 (A) by (∑ i p i δ i )(x) = ∑ i p i δ i (x) for x ∈ X . Then r(θ , ∑ i p i δ i ) = ∑ i p i r(θ , δ i ) < ∞, and so we see that ∑ i p i δ i ∈ D and r(θ , ·) is a linear function on D for every θ ∈ Θ. 2.1. Admissibility. In general, the risk functions of two decision procedures are incomparable, as one procedure may present greater risk in one state, yet less risk in another. Some cases, however, are clear cut: the notion of domination induces a partial order on the space of decision procedures.
Note that δ is dominated by δ ′ if δ is 0-dominated by δ ′ . If a decision procedure δ is ε-dominated by another decision procedure δ ′ , then, computational issues notwithstanding, δ should be eliminated from consideration. This gives rise to the following definition:
Again, note that δ is admissible among C if δ is 0-admissible among C . Clearly admissibility implies extended admissibility. In other words, the class of all extended admissible decision procedures contains the class of all admissible decision procedures.
Admissibility leads to the notion of a complete class.
Then A is a complete subclass of C if, for all δ ∈ C \ A , there exists δ 0 ∈ A such that δ 0 dominates δ . Similarly, A is an essentially complete subclass of C if, for all δ ∈ C \ A , there exists δ 0 ∈ A such that r(θ , δ 0 ) ≤ r(θ , δ ) for all θ ∈ Θ. An essentially complete class is an essentially complete subclass of D.
If a decision procedure δ is admissible among C , then every complete subclass of C must contain δ . Note that the term complete class is usually used to refer to a complete subclass of some essentially complete class (such as D itself or D 0 under the conditions described in Section 2.3.)
The next lemma captures a key consequence of essential completeness:
LEMMA 2.4. Suppose A is an essentially complete subclass of C , then extended admissible among A implies extended admissible among C .
The class of extended admissible estimators plays a central role in this paper. It is not hard, however, to construct statistical decision problems for which the class is empty, and thus not a complete class. Suppose that, for all sequences δ , δ 1 , δ 2 , . . . ∈ C and nondecreasing sequences ε 1 , ε 2 , · · · ∈ R >0 such that ε 0 = lim i ε i exists and δ is ε i -dominated by δ i for all i ∈ N, there is a decision procedure δ 0 ∈ C such that δ is ε 0 -dominated by δ 0 . Then the set of procedures that are extended admissible among C form a complete subclass of C .
PROOF. Let S = {x ∈ R Θ : (∃δ ∈ C ) (∀θ ∈ Θ) x(θ ) = r(θ , δ )} denote the risk set of C . Pick δ ∈ C and suppose δ is not extended admissible among C . Let
Let M be the set {ε ∈ R >0 : Q ε (δ ) ∩ S = / 0}, which is nonempty because δ is not extended admissible among C . As the risk is nonnegative and finite, M is also bounded above. Hence there exists a least upper bound ε 0 of M. Pick a nondecreasing sequence ε 1 , ε 2 , . . . ∈ M that converges to ε 0 . We now construct a (potentially infinite) sequence of decision procedures inductively:
there must exist such a procedure. 2. Suppose we have chosen δ 1 , . . ., δ i ∈ C , and suppose there is an index j ∈ N such that δ is ε j -dominated by δ i but δ is not ε j+1 -dominated by δ i . Then we choose δ i+1 ∈ C such that δ is ε j+1 -dominated by δ i+1 . Because M contains ε j+1 , there must exist such a procedure. If no such index j exist, the process halts at stage i.
Suppose the process halts at some finite stage i 0 . Then for, all j ∈ N, δ is not ε j -dominated by δ i 0 or δ is ε j+1 -dominated by δ i 0 . But δ is ε 1 -dominated by δ i 0 and so, by induction, δ is ε j -dominated by δ i 0 for all j ∈ N. As the sequence ε 1 , ε 2 , . . . is non-decreasing and has a limit ε 0 , it follows easily via a contrapositive argument that δ is even ε 0 -dominated by δ i 0 . If δ i 0 were not extended admissible among C , then this would contradict the fact that ε 0 is a least upper bound on M.
Now suppose the process continues indefinitely. Then the claim is that δ is ε idominated by δ i for all i ∈ N. Clearly this holds for i = 1. Supposing it holds for i ≤ k. Then δ is ε i -dominated by δ k for all i ≤ k and there exists j ∈ N such that δ is ε j -dominated by δ k but δ is not ε j+1 -dominated by δ k . It follows that j ≥ k, hence δ is ε k+1 -dominated by δ k+1 , as was to be shown.
Thus, by hypothesis, there is a decision procedure δ ′ ∈ C such that δ is ε 0 -dominated by δ ′ . As ε 0 is the least upper bound of M, δ ′ is also extended admissible among C , completing the proof.
Bayes optimality.
Consider now the Bayesian framework, in which one adopts a prior, i.e., a probability measure π defined on some σ -algebra on Θ. Irrespective of the interpretation of π, we may define the Bayes risk of a procedure as the expected risk under a parameter chosen at random from π. 1 DEFINITION 2.7. Let δ ∈ D, ε ≥ 0, and C ⊆ D, and let π 0 be a prior.
The Bayes risk under
δ is extended Bayes among C if, for all ε > 0, there exists a prior π such that δ is ε-Bayes under π among C . 1 We must now also assume that r(·, δ ) is a measurable function for every δ ∈ D. Normally, there is a natural choice of σ -algebra on Θ that satisfies this constraint. Even if there is no natural choice, there is always a sufficiently rich σ -algebra that renders every risk function measurable. In particular, the power set of Θ suffices. Note that the σ -algebra determines the set of possible prior distributions. In the extreme case where the σ -algebra on Θ is taken to be the entire power set, the set of prior distributions contain the purely atomic distributions and these are the only distributions if and only if there is no real-valued measurable cardinal less than or equal to the continuum [12, Thm. 1D]. As we will see, the purely atomic distributions suffice to give our complete class theorems.
5. δ is ε-Bayes among C (resp., Bayes among C ) if there exists a prior π such that δ is ε-Bayes under π among C (resp., Bayes under π among C ).
We will sometimes write Bayes among C with respect to π 0 to mean Bayes under π 0 among C , and similarly for ε-Bayes among C .
The following well-known result establishes a basic connection between Bayes optimality and admissibility (see, e.g., [4, Thm. 5.5.1]). We give a proof for completeness. THEOREM 2.8. If δ is Bayes among C , then δ is extended Bayes among C , and then δ is extended admissible among C .
PROOF. That Bayes implies extended Bayes follows trivially from definitions. Now assume δ is not extended admissible among C . Then there exists ε > 0 and
Note that neither extended admissibility nor admissibility imply Bayes optimality, in general. E.g., the maximum likelihood estimator in a univariate normallocation problem is admissible, but not Bayes.
Essential completeness allows us to strengthen a Bayes optimality claim: THEOREM 2.9. Suppose A is an essentially complete subclass of C , then ε-Bayes among A implies ε-Bayes among C for every ε ≥ 0.
PROOF. Let δ 0 be Bayes under π among A for some prior π. Let 
2.3.
Convexity. An important class of statistical decision problems are those in which the action space A is itself a vector space over the field R. In that case, the mean estimate A a δ (x, da) is well defined for every δ ∈ D 0,FC and x ∈ X , which motivates the following definition.
da) ∈ A and 0 otherwise, for every x ∈ X and measurable subset A ⊆ A.
When the loss function is assumed to be convex, it is well known that the mean action will be no worse on average than the original randomized one. We formalize this condition below and prove several well-known results for completeness.
CONDITION LC (loss convexity).
A is a vector space over the field R and the loss function ℓ is convex with respect to the second argument. 
PROOF. Let θ ∈ Θ. By convexity of ℓ in its second parameter and a finitedimensional version of Jensen's inequality [10, §2.8 Lem. 1], we have
Irrespective of the dimensionality of the action space A, we may use a finite-dimensional version of Jensen's inequality because the procedure δ ∈ D 0,FC is a finite mixture of nonrandomized procedures. The proof for a general randomized procedure δ ∈ D and a general action space A, would require additional hypotheses to account for the possible failure of Jensen's inequality (see [20] ) and the possible lack of measurability of E(δ ) (see [10, S2.8] 3. Prior work. The first key results on admissibility and Bayes optimality are due to Abraham Wald, who laid the foundation of sequential decision theory. In [30] , working in the setting of sequential statistical decision problems with compact parameter spaces, Wald showed that the Bayes decision procedures form an essentially complete class. Sequential decision problems differ from the decision problems we will be discussing in this paper in the sense that it gives the statistician the freedom to look at a sequence of observations one at a time and to decide, after each observation, whether to stop and take an action or to continue, potentially at some cost. The decision problems we will be discussing in this paper can be seen as special cases of sequential decision problems with only one observation.
In order to prove his results, Wald required a strong form of continuity for his risk and loss functions. Topologies on Θ, A, and D are generated by these notions of convergence. In the following result and elsewhere, a model P is said to admit (a measurable family of) densities ( f θ ) θ ∈Θ (with respect to a dominating (σ -finite) measure ν) when P θ (A) = A f θ (x) ν(dx) for every θ ∈ Θ and measurable A ⊆ X . In terms of these densities, there is a unique Bayes solution with respect to a prior π on Θ when, for every x ∈ X , except perhaps for a set of ν-measure 0, there exists one and only one action a * ∈ A for which the expression
takes its minimum value with respect to a ∈ A. (Another notion of uniqueness used in the literature is to simply demand that the risk functions of two Bayes solutions agree.) The main result can be stated in the special case of a nonsequential decision problem as follows: In many classical statistical decision problems, one does not lose anything by assuming that all risk functions are continuous. The following theorem, taken from [17] , formalizes this intuition: We will say that a model P has a continuous like- In the noncompact setting, Bayes procedures generally do not form a complete class. With a view to generalizing the notion of a Bayes procedure and recovering a complete class, Wald [31] introduced the notion of "Bayes in the wide sense", which we now call extended Bayes (see Definition 2.7). The formal statement of the following theorem is adapted from [10] Wald also studied taking the "closure" (in a suitable sense) of the collection of all Bayes procedures, and showed that every admissible procedure was contained in this new class. The first result of this form appears in [31] and is extended later in [16] . Brown 
where δ π n is a Bayes procedure with respect to π n .
In the normal-location model under squared error loss, the sample mean, while not a Bayes estimator in the strict sense, can be seen as a limit of Bayes estimators, e.g., with respect to normal priors of variance K as K → ∞ or uniform priors on
(We revisit this problem in Example 8.2.) In his seminal paper, Sacks [23] observes that the sample mean is also the Bayes solution if the notion of prior distribution is relaxed to include Lebesgue measure on the real line. Sacks [23] raised the natural question: if δ is a limit of Bayes estimators, is there a measure m on the real line such that δ is "Bayes" with respect to this measure? A solution in this latter form was termed a generalized Bayes solution by Sacks [23] . The following definition is adapted from [28] : DEFINITION 3.9. A decision procedure δ 0 is a normal-form generalized Bayes procedure with respect to a σ -finite measure π on Θ when δ m minimizes r(π, δ ) = r(θ , δ )π(dθ ), subject to the restriction that r(π, δ m ) < ∞. If P admits densities ( f θ ) θ ∈Θ with respect to a σ -finite measure ν and δ 0 minimizes the unnormalized posterior risk ℓ(θ , δ 0 (x)) f θ (x) π(dθ ) for ν-a.e. x, then δ 0 is a (extensive-form) generalized Bayes procedure with respect to π.
When a model admits densities, Stone [28] showed that every normal-form generalized Bayes procedure is also extensive-form. (Sacks defined generalized Bayes in extensive form, but demanded also that f θ (·) π(dθ ) be finite ν-a.e. The notion of normal-and extensive-form definitions of Bayes optimality were introduced by Raiffa and Schlaifer [21] .) For exponential families, under suitable conditions, one can show that every admissible estimator is generalized Bayes. The first such result was developed by Sacks [23] in his original paper: he proved that, for statistical decision problems where the model admits a density of the form e xθ /Z θ with Z θ = e xθ ν(dθ ), every admissible estimator is generalized Bayes. Stone [28] extended this result to estimation of the mean in one-dimensional exponential families under squared error loss. These results were further generalized in similar ways by Brown [5, Sec. 3 .1] and Berger and Srinivasan [3] . The following theorem is given in [3] . We adapt the statement of this theorem from [17] . 
Then every admissible estimator is generalized Bayes.
Other generalized notions of Bayes procedures have been proposed. Heath and Sudderth [11] study statistical decision problems in the setting of finitely additive probability spaces. The following theorem is their main result:
]). Fix a class D of decision procedures. Every finitely additive Bayes decision procedure is extended admissible. If the loss function is bounded and the class D is convex, then every extended admissible decision procedure in D is finitely additive Bayes in D.
The simplicity of this statement is remarkable. However, the assumption of boundedness is very strong, and rule out many standard estimation problems on unbounded spaces. We will succeed in removing the boundedness assumption by moving to a sufficiently saturated nonstandard model.
Nonstandard admissibility.
As we have seen in the previous section, strong regularity appears to be necessary to align Bayes optimality and admissibility. In noncompact parameter spaces, the statistician must apparently abandon the strict use of probability measures in order to represent certain extreme states of uncertainty that correspond with admissible procedures. Even then, strong regularity conditions are required (such as domination of the model and strict positiveness of densities, ruling out estimation in infinite-dimensional contexts). In the remainder of the paper, we describe a new approach using nonstandard analysis, in which the statistician retains the use of probability measures, but has access to a much richer collection of real numbers to express their beliefs.
Let (Θ, A, ℓ, X , P) be a standard statistical decision problem. We will assume the reader is familiar with basic concepts and key results in nonstandard analysis. (See Appendices A and B for a review tailored to this paper.) For a set S, let P(S) denote its power set. We assume that we are working within a nonstandard model containing V ⊇ R ∪ Θ ∪ A ∪ X , P(V ), P(V ∪ P(V )), . . ., and we assume the model is as saturated as necessary. We use * to denote the nonstandard extension map taking elements, sets, functions, relations, etc., to their nonstandard counterparts. In particular, * R and * N denote the nonstandard extensions of the reals and natural numbers, respectively. Given a topological space (Y, T ) and a subset X ⊆ * Y , let NS(X ) ⊆ X denote the subset of near-standard elements (defined by the monadic structure induced by T ) and let st : NS(Y ) → Y denote the standard part map taking near-standard elements to their standard parts. In both cases, the notation elides the underlying space Y and the topology T , because the space and topology will always be clear from context. As an abbreviation, we will write • x for st(x) for atomic elements x. For functions f , we will write • f for the composition x → st( f (x)). Finally, given an internal (hyperfinitely additive) probability space (Ω, F , P), we will write (Ω, F , P) to denote the corresponding Loeb space, i.e., the completion of the unique extension of P to σ (F ).
Nonstandard extension of a statistical decision problem.
We will assume that Θ is a Hausdorff space and adopt its Borel σ -algebra B[Θ]. 2 One should view the model P as a function from Θ to the space M 1 (X ) of probability measures on X . Write * P y for ( * P) y . For every y ∈ * Θ, the transfer principle implies that * P y is an internal probability measure on * X (defined on the extension of its σ -algebra). By Lemma B.1, we know that * (P θ ) = * P θ for θ ∈ Θ, as one would expect from the notation.
Recall that standard decision procedures δ ∈ D have finite risk functions. Therefore, the risk map (θ , δ ) → r(θ , δ ) is a function from Θ × D to R. By the extension and transfer principles, the nonstandard extension * r is an internal function from * Θ × * D to * R. and * δ ∈ * D if δ ∈ D. The transfer principle also implies that every ∆ ∈ * D is an internal function from * X to * M 1 (A). The * risk function of ∆ ∈ * D is the function * r(·, ∆) from * Θ to * R. By the transfer of the equation defining risk, the following statement holds:
As is customary, we will simply write for * , provided the context is clear. (We will also drop * from the extensions of common functions and relations like addition, multiplication, less-than-or-equal-to, etc.) 4.2. Nonstandard admissibility. Let δ 0 , δ ∈ D, let ε ∈ R ≥0 , and assume δ 0 is ε-dominated by δ . Then there exists θ 0 ∈ Θ such that
By the transfer principle,
. These results motivate the following nonstandard version of domination.
Write * dominated in R/S for 0- * dominated in R/S, and write ε- * dominated on S for ε- * dominated in S/S.
The following results are immediate upon inspection of the definition above, and the fact that (1) implies (2) for R ⊆ S when ε > 0.
The following result connects standard and nonstandard domination.
The following statements are equivalent: 
Because * r(θ 0 , * δ ) = r(θ 0 , δ ), and likewise for δ 0 , it follows that
Similarly, • ( * r(θ 0 , * δ )) = r(θ 0 , δ ), and likewise for δ 0 , hence Lemma A.7.1 implies
DEFINITION 4.4. Let ε ∈ R ≥0 , R, S ⊆ * Θ, and C ⊆ * D, and ∆ ∈ * D.
The following result is immediate upon inspection of the definitions above.
The analogous results for * admissible in R/S among C and * extended admissible on S among C then follow immediately. The following result connects standard and nonstandard admissibility.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
If ε > 0, then the following statement is also equivalent:
By Theorem 4.3 and the definition of C * , this is equivalent to both
Now let ε > 0. Then the above statements are also equivalent to
hence (1 ⇐⇒ 4). From Lemma 4.5, we see that (5) implies (4) . To see that (1) implies (5), note that, because ε is standard and ε > 0, (1) is equivalent to
By transfer, this statement holds if and only if the following statement holds:
The following corollary for extended admissibility follows immediately. THEOREM 4.7. Let δ 0 ∈ D and C ⊆ D. Define C * = { * δ : δ ∈ C }. Then the following statements are equivalent:
As in the standard universe, the notion of * admissibility lead to notions of complete classes.
Near-standard essential completeness allows us to enlarge the set of decision procedures amongst which a decision procedure is extended admissible. PROOF. Let ∆ 0 ∈ A and suppose ∆ 0 is not * extended admissible on Θ among C . Then there exists ∆ ∈ C and ε ∈ R >0 such that * r(θ , ∆) ≤ * r(θ , ∆ 0 ) − ε for all θ ∈ Θ. But then by the * essential completeness of A , there exists some
But then ∆ 0 is not ε/2- * admissible on Θ among A hence not * extended admissible on Θ among A .
5. Nonstandard Bayes. We now define the nonstandard counterparts to Bayes risk and optimality for the class * D of internal decision procedures: DEFINITION 5.1. Let ∆ ∈ * D, ε ∈ * R ≥0 , and C ⊆ * D, and let Π 0 be a nonstandard prior, i.e., an internal probability measure on ( * Θ, * B[Θ]).
The internal Bayes risk under
∆ is ε- * Bayes among C (resp., nonstandard Bayes among C ) if there exists a nonstandard prior Π such that ∆ is ε- * Bayes under Π among C (resp., nonstandard Bayes under Π among C ).
We will sometimes write nonstandard Bayes among C with respect to Π 0 to mean nonstandard Bayes under Π 0 among C , and similarly for ε- * Bayes among C . Note that the internal Bayes risk is precisely the extension of the standard Bayes risk. Similarly, if we consider the relation {(δ , ε, C ) ∈ D × R ≥0 × P(D) : δ is ε-Bayes among C }, then its extension corresponds to {(∆, ε, C ) ∈ * D × * R ≥0 × * P(D) : ∆ is ε- * Bayes among C }. Note, however, that our definition of "ε- * Bayes among C " allows the set C ⊆ * D to be external, and so it is not simply the transfer of the definition.
Transfer remains a powerful tool for relating the optimality of standard procedures with that of their extensions. For example, by transfer, δ is ε-Bayes under π among C if and only if * δ is ε- * Bayes under * π among * C . (Recall that * ε = ε for a real ε, by extension.) Transfer also yields the following result:
PROOF. By hypothesis, the following sentence holds:
Taking ε to be infinitesimal implies that the internal Bayes risk of * δ 0 is within an infinitesimal of the minimum Bayes risk among * C with respect to an internal probability measure on * Θ, hence * δ 0 is nonstandard Bayes among * C .
In general, we would not expect an extension * δ to be 0- * Bayes under Π among C for a generic nonstandard prior Π and class C ⊆ * D. The definition of nonstandard Bayes provides infinitesimal slack, which suffices to yield a precise characterization of extended admissible procedures. The follow result shows that, as in the standard universe, nonstandard Bayes optimality implies nonstandard extended admissibility.
PROOF. Suppose ∆ 0 is not * extended admissible on * Θ among C . Then for some standard ε ∈ R >0 , ∆ 0 is ε- * dominated on * Θ by some ∆ ∈ C , i.e.,
Hence, for every nonstandard prior Π, if * r(Π, ∆) is not hyperfinite, then neither is
As ε ∈ R >0 , we conclude that ∆ 0 cannot be nonstandard Bayes under Π among C . As Π was arbitrary, ∆ 0 is not nonstandard Bayes among C . The above result raises several questions: Are extended admissible decision procedures also nonstandard Bayes? What is the relationship with admissibility and its nonstandard counterparts?
In this section, we prove that a decision procedure δ is extended admissible if and only if * δ is nonstandard Bayes. In later sections, we give several application of this equivalence, and then consider the relationship with admissibility, which is far from settled. It is easy, however, to show that only nonstandard Bayes procedures can * dominate other nonstandard Bayes procedures: To see this, suppose that ∆ is nonstandard Bayes among C ⊆ * D with respect to some nonstandard prior Π and ∆ is not * admissible on * Θ among C . 
PROOF. The first statement follows from the logic in the preceding paragraph. Now suppose that ∆ is * dominated on * Θ by some ∆ ′ ∈ C . Then ∆ ′ is nonstandard Bayes under Π among C . But then, by hypothesis, its risk function is equivalent, up to an infinitesimal, to that of ∆, a contradiction.
Hyperdiscretized risk set.
In a statistical decision problem with a finite parameter space, one can use a separating hyperplane argument to show that every admissible decision procedure is Bayes (see, e.g., [10, §2.10 Thm. 1]). In order to prove our main theorem, we will proceed along similar lines, but with the aid of extension, transfer, and saturation.
When relating extended admissibility and Bayes optimality for a subclass C ⊆ D, the set of all risk functions r δ , for δ ∈ C , is a key structure. On a finite parameter space, the risk set for D is a convex subset of a finite-dimensional vector space over R. When the parameter space is not finite, one must grapple with infinite dimensional function spaces. However, in a sufficiently saturated nonstandard model, there exists an internal set T Θ ⊂ * Θ that is hyperfinite and contains Θ. While the risk at all points in T Θ does not suffice to characterize an arbitrary element of * D, it suffices to study the optimality of extensions of standard decision procedure relative to other extensions. Because T Θ is hyperfinite, the corresponding risk set is a convex subset of a hyperfinite-dimensional vector space over * R.
Let J Θ ∈ * N be the internal cardinality of T Θ and let T Θ = {t 1 , . . . ,t J Θ }. Recall that I( * R J Θ ) denotes the set of (internal) functions from T Θ to * R. For an element x ∈ I( * R J Θ ), we will write x k for x(k). be the set of all finite * convex combinations of * δ ∈ C .
Note that A * ⊂ * A is an external set unless A is finite. Let
It is easy to see that
Having defined the (hyperdiscretized) risk set, we now describe a set whose intersection with the risk set captures the notion of 1 n - * domination, for some standard n ∈ N. In that vein, for ∆ ∈ * D, define the PROOF. By the internal definition principle, Q(∆) n is internal. Let x, y be two points in Q(∆) n , let p ∈ * [0, 1], and pick a coordinate k. Then
Thus the set is convex. The second statement is obvious.
The following is then immediate from definitions. PROOF. We first establish that Π(k) ≥ 0 for all k. Suppose otherwise, i.e., Π(k 0 ) < 0 for some k 0 . Then we can pick a point x 0 in n∈N Q(∆) n whose k 0 -th coordinate is arbitrarily large and negative, causing Π, x 0 to be arbitrary large, a contradiction because Π, s is hyperfinite for all s ∈ S D . Hence, all coordinates of Π must be nonnegative.
Define π ∈ I( * R J Θ ) by π = Π/ Π 1 . Because Π = 0 and Π ≥ 0, we have π ≥ 0 and π 1 = 1. Therefore, π specifies an internal probability measure on ( * Θ, * B[Θ]), concentrating on T Θ , and assigning probability π(k) to t k for every k ≤ J Θ . Because
, and the limit of this expression as n → ∞ is
The previous result shows that if a nontrivial hyperplane separates the risk set from every 1 n -quantant, for n ∈ N, then the corresponding procedure is nonstandard Bayes. In order to prove our main theorem, we require a nonstandard version of the hyperplane separation theorem, which we give here. For a, b ∈ R k for some finite k, let a, b denote the inner product. We begin by stating the standard hyperplane separation theorem: THEOREM 5.14 (Hyperplane separation theorem). For any k ∈ N, let S 1 and S 2 be two disjoint convex subsets of R k , then there exists w ∈ R k \ {0} such that, for all p 1 For every D ∈ C [<∞] and n ∈ N, let φ D n (Π) be the formula 10) and let
By the above argument and the fact that C [<∞] is closed under taking finite unions and the sets Q(∆ 0 ) n , for n ∈ N, are nested, F is finitely satisfiable. Note that F has cardinality no more than κ, yet our nonstandard extension is κ-saturated by hypothesis. Therefore, by the saturation principle, there exists a nontrivial hyperplane Π satisfying every sentence in F simultaneously. That is, there exists Π ∈ I( * R J Θ ) such that Π = 0 and, for all x ∈ n∈N Q(∆ 0 ) n and for all s
Hence, by Lemma 5.13, the normalized vector Π/ Π 1 is well-defined and induces a probability measure π on * Θ concentrating on T Θ , and ∆ 0 is nonstandard Bayes under π among (C ) FC . It follows immediately that the class of extended admissible procedures is a complete class if and only if the class of procedures whose extensions are nonstandard Bayes are a complete class.
6. Applications to compact statistical decision problems. In this section, we use our nonstandard theory to prove that, under the additional hypotheses that Θ is compact (and thus normal) and all risk functions are continuous, the class of extended admissible procedures is precisely the class of Bayes procedures. The strength of our result lies in the absence of any additional assumptions on the loss or model. 3 Assume * δ is nonstandard Bayes with respect to some nonstandard prior π on * Θ. In this section, we will construct a standard probability measure π p on Θ from π in such a way that the internal risk of * δ under π is infinitesimally close to the risk of δ under π p . This then implies that π is Bayes with respect to π p , and yields a standard characterization of extended admissible procedures.
Extension allows us to associate an internal probability measure * π to every standard probability measure π. The next theorem describes a reverse process via Loeb measures. The following lemma establishes a close link between Loeb integration and integration with respect to the pushdown measure. 
PROOF. For every n ∈ N and k
As f is bounded, the collection F n = {F n,k : k ∈ Z} \ { / 0} forms a finite partition of Y , and similarly for G n = {G n,k : k ∈ Z} \ { / 0} and * Y . For every n ∈ N, definef n : Y → R andĝ n : * Y → R by puttingf n = k n on F n,k andĝ n = k n on G n,k for every k ∈ Z. Thusf n (resp.,ĝ n ) is a simple (resp., * simple) function on the partition F n (resp., G n ). By constructionf n ≤ f <f n + 1 n andĝ n ≤ g <ĝ n + 1 n . Note that G n,k = st −1 (F n,k ) for every n ∈ N and k ∈ Z. Moreover, Y is even regular Hausdorff, hence Theorem B.8 implies that G n,k is ν-measurable. It follows that f dν p = lim n→∞ f n dν p and gdν = lim n→∞ ĝ n dν. Moreover, by Lemma 6.1, we have ν(G n,k ) = ν p (F n,k ) for every n ∈ N and k ∈ Z. Thus, for every n ∈ N and k ∈ Z, we have f n dν p = ĝ n dν. Hence we have g dν = f dν p , completing the proof.
In order to control the difference between the internal and standard Bayes risks under a nonstandard prior π and its pushdown π p , it will suffice to require that risk functions be continuous. (Recall that we quoted results listing natural conditions that imply continuous risk in Theorems 3.4 and 3.5.)
CONDITION RC (risk continuity). r(·, δ ) is continuous on Θ, for all δ ∈ D.
In order to understand the nonstandard implications of this regularity condition, we introduce the following definition from nonstandard analysis. DEFINITION 6.6. Let X and Y be topological spaces. A function f :
A fundamental result in nonstandard analysis links continuity and S-continuity:
LEMMA 6.7. Let X and Y be Hausdorff spaces, where Y is also locally compact, and let D ⊆ X . If a function f : X → Y is continuous on D then its extension * f is NS( * Y )-valued and S-continuous on NS( * D).
See Appendix A.2 for a proof of this classical result. We are now at the place to establish the correspondence between internal Bayes risk and standard Bayes risk. The proof relies on the following technical lemma. PROOF. Because Θ is compact Hausdorff, • t exists for all t ∈ * Θ and Lemma 6.1 implies π p is a probability measure on (Θ, C ), where C is the π p -completion of B [Θ] . By (RC) and Lemma 6.7, for all t ∈ * Θ, we have *
LEMMA 6.8 ([1, Cor. 4.6.1]). Suppose (Ω, F , P) is an internal probability space, and F : Ω → * R is an internal P-integrable function such that
By (RC) and the fact that Θ is compact, it follows that r(·, δ 0 ) is bounded. Thus, by Lemma 6.5, * r( • t, * δ 0 )π(dt) = r(θ , δ 0 )π p (dθ ), completing the proof. PROOF. By Theorem 5.17, we may assume that * δ 0 is nonstandard Bayes among C * with respect to a nonstandard prior π that concentrates on some hyperfinite set T . Let δ ∈ C . Then * δ ∈ C * , hence * r(π, * δ 0 ) * r(π, * δ ). Let π p denote the pushdown of π. As Θ is compact Hausdorff, we know that π p is a probability measure. As π concentrates on the hyperfinite set T , we know that * r(·, * δ 0 ) and * r(·, * δ ) are π-integrable. By Lemma 6.9, we have r(π p , δ 0 ) ≈ * r(π, * δ 0 ) and r(π p , δ ) ≈ * r(π, * δ ). Then Lemma A.7.2 implies that r(π p , δ 0 ) ≤ r(π p , δ ). As our choice of δ was arbitrary, δ 0 is Bayes under π p among C . Statements (2) and (3) 7. Admissibility of nonstandard Bayes procedures. Heretofore, we have focused on the connection between extended admissibility and nonstandard Bayes optimality. In this section, we shift our focus to the admissibility of decision procedures whose extensions are nonstandard Bayes. In all but the final result of this section, we will assume that Θ is a metric space and write d for the metric.
On finite parameter spaces with bounded loss, it is known that Bayes procedures with respect to priors assigning positive mass to every state are admissible. Similarly, when risk functions are continuous, Bayes procedures with respect to priors with full support are admissible. We can establish analogues of these result on general parameter spaces by a suitable nonstandard relaxation of a standard prior having full support. DEFINITION 7.1. For x, y ∈ * R, write x ≫ y when γ x > y for all γ ∈ R >0 . DEFINITION 7.2. Let X be a metric space with metric d, and let ε ∈ * R >0 . An internal probability measure π on * Θ is ε-regular if, for every θ 0 ∈ Θ and noninfinitesimal r > 0, we have π({t ∈ * Θ :
The following result establishes * admissibility from * Bayes optimality under conditions analogues to full support and continuity of the risk function. PROOF. Suppose ∆ 0 is not * admissible in Θ/ * Θ among C . Then, for some ∆ ∈ C and θ 0 ∈ Θ, it holds that
From Eq. (7.2), * r(θ 0 , ∆ 0 ) − * r(θ 0 , ∆) > 2γ for some positive γ ∈ R. Let A be the set of all a ∈ * R >0 such that
By the S-continuity of * r on NS( * Θ), the set A contains all infinitesimals. By Corollary A.9 and the fact that A is an internal set, A must contain some positive a 0 ∈ R. In summary,
By the internal definition principle, M is an internal set. By Eq. (7.1) and the definition and internality of M, the difference in internal Bayes risk between ∆ 0 and ∆ satisfies * r(π,
But γ π(M) > ε because π is ε-regular, hence ∆ 0 is not ε- * Bayes among C with respect to π.
The following theorem is an immediate consequence of Lemma 7.3 and is a nonstandard analogue of Blyth's Method [17, §5 Thm. 7.13] (see also [17, §5 Thm. 8.7] ). In Blyth's method, a sequence of (potentially improper) priors with sufficient support is used to establish the admissibility of a decision procedure. In contrast, a single nonstandard prior witnesses the nonstandard admissibility of a nonstandard Bayes procedure. PROOF. By (RC) and Lemma 6.7, for all δ ∈ D, θ 0 ∈ Θ, and t ≈ θ 0 , we have * r(t, * δ ) ≈ * r(θ 0 , * δ ). By Lemma 7.3, * δ 0 is * admissible in Θ/ * Θ among C * .
These theorems have the following consequence for standard decision procedures: THEOREM 7.5. Suppose Θ is a metric space and (RC) holds, and let δ 0 ∈ D and C ⊆ D. If there exists ε ∈ * R >0 such that * δ 0 is ε- * Bayes among C * = { * δ : δ ∈ C } with respect to an ε-regular nonstandard prior, then δ 0 is admissible among C . PROOF. Note that δ 0 is Bayes under π among D if and only if * δ 0 is nonstandard Bayes under * π among D * . As π has full support, * π is ε-regular for every infinitesimal ε ∈ * R >0 . By Theorem 7.5, we have the desired result.
We close with an admissibility result requiring no additional regularity: THEOREM 7.7. Let δ 0 ∈ D and C ⊆ D. If there exists ε ∈ * R >0 such that * δ 0 is ε- * Bayes among * C with respect to a nonstandard prior π satisfying π{θ } ≫ ε for all θ ∈ Θ, then δ 0 is admissible among C .
PROOF. Suppose δ 0 is not admissible among C . Then by Theorem 4.6, * δ 0 is not * admissible in Θ/ * Θ among C * . Thus there exists δ ∈ C and θ 0 ∈ Θ such that * r(θ , * δ ) ≤ * r(θ , * δ 0 ) for all θ ∈ * Θ and * r(θ 0 , * δ 0 ) − * r(θ 0 , * δ ) > γ for some γ ∈ R >0 . Then * r(π, * δ 0 ) − * r(π, * δ ) ≥ π{θ 0 }γ > ε. But this implies that * δ 0 is not ε- * Bayes under π among C . REMARK 7.8. The astute reader may notice that Theorem 7.7 is actually a corollary of Theorem 7.5 provided we adopt the discrete topology/metric on Θ. Changing the metric changes the set of available prior distributions and also changes the set of ε-regular nonstandard priors. See also Remark 8.4.
Some Examples.
The following examples serve to highlight some of the interesting properties of our nonstandard theory and its consequences for classical problems. EXAMPLE 8.1. Consider any standard statistical decision problem with a finite discrete (hence compact) parameter space. (RC) holds trivially, and so Theorem 6.11 and Corollary 6.12 imply that a decision procedure is extended admissible if and only if it is extended Bayes if and only if it is Bayes if and only if its extension is nonstandard Bayes among all internal decision procedures. By Theorem 7.6, we obtain another classical result: if a procedure is Bayes with respect to a prior with full support, it is admissible. EXAMPLE 8.2. Consider the classical problem of estimating the mean of a multivariate normal distribution in d dimensions under squared error when the covariance matrix is known to be the identity matrix. By the convexity of the squared error loss function, Lemma 2.13 implies the nonrandomized procedures form an essentially complete class (indeed, the loss is strictly convex and so the nonrandomized procedures are actually a complete class). Theorem 5.17 implies that every extended admissible estimator among D 0 is nonstandard Bayes among D * 0,FC . We can derive further results by noting that risk functions are continuous, which follows from a general theorem on exponential families: THEOREM 8.3 ([17, §5 Ex. 7.10]). Assume P is an exponential family. Then, for any loss function ℓ such that the risk is always finite, the risk function is continuous.
Thus (RC) holds. Theorem 7.6 then implies that every Bayes estimator with respect to a prior with full support is admissible. In particular, for every k > 0,
x is Bayes with respect to the full-support prior π k = N (0, k 2 I d ), hence admissible.
Consider now the maximum likelihood estimator δ M (x) = x and let K be an infinite natural number.
is the extension of the function k → δ B k . The normal prior ( * π) K is "flat" on R in the sense that, at every near-standard real number, the density is within an infinitesimal of (2π) − 1 2 K −d . These observations provide a nonstandard interpretation to the idea that the MLE estimator is a Bayes estimator given a "uniform" prior.
Since (RC) holds, Theorem 7.5 implies that every estimator whose extension is ε- * Bayes among * D 0 with respect to an ε-regular prior is admissible among D 0 . An easy calculation reveals that the Bayes risk of
, while the Bayes risk of * δ M with respect to
nonstandard Bayes among * D, and in particular, * δ M is ε- * Bayes among * D for ε = (K 2 + 1) −1 . From the density above, it is then straightforward to verify that, for d = 1 and d = 2, the prior ( * π) K is ε-regular, but that it fails to be for d ≥ 3. Therefore, by Theorem 7.5, it follows that δ M is admissible among D 0 for d = 1 and d = 2, as is well known. The theorem is silent in this case for d ≥ 3. Indeed, Stein [27] famously showed that δ M is inadmissible for d ≥ 3. REMARK 8.4. Here we have used Theorem 7.5 and the standard metric on Θ = R d in order to establish admissibility. Note that the infinite-variance Gaussian prior is not ε-regular with respect to the discrete metric on Θ, and so a different nonstandard prior would have been needed to establish admissibility via Theorem 7.7.
In Section 6, we established that class of Bayes procedures coincides with the class of extended admissible estimators under compactness of the parameter space and continuity of the risk. The next example demonstrates that extended admissibility and Bayes optimality do not necessarily align if we drop the risk continuity assumption, even when the parameter space is compact. We study a non-Bayes admissible estimator and characterize a nonstandard prior with respect to which it is nonstandard Bayes. 
and so, for sufficiently large n, we have r (n −1 , (a, b)) ≥ r(n −1 , (c, c) ). But, for every d > 0 and sufficiently large n, it also holds that r(n −1 , (d, d)) > r(n −1 , (0, 0) ). Hence, (a, b) does not dominate (0, 0), hence (0, 0) is admissible.
To see that (0, 0) is not Bayes, note that an estimator (a, b) has the same Bayes risk under π as it would under the (pushforward) prior ν = π • g −1 in the statistical decision problem with sample space X , parameter space
, and squared error loss ℓ ′ (x, y) = (x, y). However, in this case, the loss is strictly convex and so the Bayes optimal decision is unique and is the posterior mean, which is a value in (0, 1], hence (0, 0) cannot be Bayes optimal for any prior.
The failure of (0, 0) to be Bayes optimal is due to the fact that the posterior mean cannot be 0. However, in the nonstandard universe, the posterior mean can be made to be infinitesimal, in which case the Bayes risk of (0, 0) is also infinitesimal. PROOF. Pick any positive infinitesimal ε and consider the nonstandard prior π concentrated on ε. The nonstandard Bayes risk of (0, 0) with respect to π is * r (π, (0, 0) 
Because the loss function in Example 8.5 is nonnegative, (0, 0) must be a nonstandard Bayes estimator with respect to π.
We close by observing that (0, 0) is a generalized Bayesian estimator. In particular, the generalized Bayes risk with respect to the improper prior π(dθ ) = θ −2 dθ is finite, whereas every other estimator has infinite Bayes risk. The modified statistical decision problem with parameter space Θ ′ = (0, 1] under the standard topology, model P ′ and loss ℓ ′ meets the hypotheses of Theorem 3.10-indeed, the modified problem is that of estimating the mean of an exponential family model-hence every extended admissible procedure is generalized Bayes. The original problem does not meet the hypotheses of Theorem 3.10, since the loss is not jointly continuous.
Miscellaneous remarks.
(i) We have required Θ to be Hausdorff in order for the standard part map to be uniquely defined. Relaxing this assumption would require that we work with a standard part relation instead. At this moment, we see no roadblocks.
(ii) Assume * δ is nonstandard Bayes among C * . Under what conditions can we conclude that * δ is nonstandard Bayes among * C ? 0- * Bayes among C * ? Among * C ? In Corollary 6.12, we show that these conclusions follow for C = D 0,FC when Θ is compact Hausdorff and (RC) holds. Can we weaken these conditions or find incomparable ones? A related problem is to identify conditions under which δ is * extended admissible on Θ among * C . As a starting point, it is an open problem to find a procedure δ such that either 1) (iii) We restricted our attention to decision procedures whose risk functions are everywhere finite. However, if we do not make this restriction, it is possible for an admissible decision procedures to have infinite risk in some state θ ∈ Θ [6, §4A.13 Part (iv)]. We make repeated use of the finite risk property and so it would be an interesting contribution to relax this assumption. A related issue is our restriction to nonnegative real-valued loss functions. It would be straightforward to allow loss functions that are bounded below or above. Allowing arbitrary loss functions, however, raises the possibility that a decision procedure's risk could be undefined on some subset of the parameter space.
(iv) It is worth searching for a converse to Theorem 7.7, perhaps with a view to identifying a nonstandard analogue of Stein's necessary and sufficient condition for admissibility [26] , but one witnessed by a single (nonstandard) prior distribution.
(v) Our standard result, Theorem 6.11, is similar to Theorem 3.6 of Berger [2] and Theorem 3.3 of Wald [30] . Our theorem identifies the class of extended admissible procedures and the class of Bayes procedures, and does so by assuming that risk functions are continuous and the parameter space is compact Hausdorff. These are weaker assumptions than those of Berger, and more natural than those of Wald. It would take some work to understand which assumptions of theirs are needed to show that the extended admissible procedures (equivalently, the Bayes procedures) form a complete class. In our opinion, it is preferable to understand conditions under which we can identifying extended admissibility and Bayes optimality and then separately understand conditions under which the former is a complete class. (The classical textbook by Blackwell and Girschick [4] adopts a similar aesthetic principle.) We believe that the methods developed in this paper may allow us to remove or generalize regularity conditions in other existing results.
(vi) It would be illuminating to uncover a complete characterization of the relationships between nonstandard Bayes procedures, extended Bayes procedures, limits of Bayes procedures, and generalized Bayes procedures. Some connections can be identified simply by transfer: e.g., we already know that extended Bayes procedures are nonstandard Bayes by a simple transfer argument. Given our theorems connecting extended admissibility and nonstandard Bayes optimality, progress on this question immediately yields new connections between extended admissibility and these relaxed notions of Bayes optimality.
(vii) Under compactness and risk continuity, extended admissible procedures are nonstandard Bayes among all internal decision procedures. In general, however, an extended admissible procedure is nonstandard Bayes only among the nonstandard extensions of standard procedures. Can we find an example witnessing the gap between these two results? In particular, can we identify a decision problem for which the extension of some (all, most) (extended) admissible decision procedure(s) is (are) not nonstandard Bayes among all internal decision procedures?
A: NONSTANDARD ANALYSIS -BASIC NOTIONS AND KEY RESULTS
In this appendix, we give a brief introduction for those readers not familiar with nonstandard analysis. The interested reader can find a thorough introduction in [22] . For modern applications of nonstandard analysis, one can read [1] or [8] . Our following introduction of nonstandard analysis owes much to [1] .
For a set S, let P(S) denote its power set. Given any set S, define V 0 (S) = S and V n+1 (S) = V n (S) ∪ P(V n (S)) for all n ∈ N. Then V(S) = n∈N V n (S) is called the superstructure of S, and S is called the ground set of the superstructure V(S). We treat the members of S as indivisible atomics. The rank of an object a ∈ V(S) is the smallest k for which a ∈ V k (S). The members of S have rank 0. The objects of rank no less than 1 in V(S) are precisely the sets in V(S). The empty set / 0 and S both have rank 1.
We now formally define the language L (V(S)): For every element c ∈ V(S), we introduce a constant symbolc. We also fix a countable collection of variable symbols v 1 , v 2 , . . . , distinct from the constants and the following reserved symbols: =, ∈, ), (, ∧, ∨, ¬, ∀, and ∃. The (bounded) formulas in L (V(S)) are defined recursively:
• If u and v are constant/variable symbols, then (u = v) and (u ∈ v) are formulas.
• If φ and ψ are formulas, then (φ ∧ ψ), (φ ∨ ψ), and (¬φ ) are formulas.
• If φ is a formula and u is a variable, and v is a constant or variable symbol distinct from u, then (∀u ∈ v)(φ ) and (∃u ∈ v)(φ ) are formulas.
A variable x is free in a formula φ if it is not within the scope of any quantifiers. More carefully: x is free in (u = v) if either u or v is the variable x, and similarly for (u ∈ v); x is free in (φ ∧ ψ) if it is free in either φ or ψ, and similarly for ∨ and ¬; x is free in (∀u ∈ v)(φ ) if x is not u and x is v or x is free in φ , and similarly for (∀u ∈ v)(φ ). We will sometimes write φ (x 1 , . . . , x n ) to mean that x 1 , . . . , x n are exactly the free variables in φ , and write φ (c 1 , . . . , c n ) to mean the formula φ where we substitute every free occurrence of x i with the constant c i , for every i = 1, . . ., n. (See [7] for a careful description of substitution.)
A sentence is a formula with no free variables. Informally, sentences in L (V(S)) are either true or false statements about V(S). We formalize this here via statements of the form φ holds in V(S).
• (c 1 =c 2 ) holds in V(S) if and only if c 1 = c 2 ;
• (c 1 ∈c 2 ) holds in V(S) if and only if c 2 has rank 1 or higher and c 1 ∈ c 2 ;
• (φ ∧ ψ) holds in V(S) if and only if φ holds in V(S) and ψ holds in V(S), and similarly for ∨ and ¬; • (∀u ∈c)(φ (u)) holds in V(S) if and only if, for all x ∈ c, the sentence φ (c) holds in V(S), and similarly for (∃u ∈ v)(φ (u)).
We will also write that φ is true in V(S) to mean φ holds in V(S). When the structure V(S) is clear from context, we will simply write that φ holds or that φ is true. We will use the following abbreviations: (φ =⇒ ψ) for ((¬φ ) ∨ (ψ)) and
It may seem necessary (or at least useful) to include function and relation symbols in our language for every function and relation in C ⊆ V(S). For example, one would expect (∃x ∈R) (1+x =3) to be a well-formed sentence in L (V(R)). (Writing¯over every constant is cumbersome and unnecessary in practice, and so we will drop this symbol from now on.) In fact, every relation and function symbol is, in effect, already available, because there is a mechanical way to translate formulas with function and relation symbols into the above language (and in a way that commutes with taking * -transfers as defined below). Informally, the translation works as follows: First, function symbols are removed by rewriting them in terms of their graph relations using additional quantifiers. Second, because every relation is an element in V(S) and thus a constant in the language, relation symbols can be replaced with statements of the form a ∈ b, where a is a tuple. Finally, tuples can be mechanically encoded once elements of products spaces are encoded as sets of sets in a canonical way. Thus our language is powerful enough to represent formula with relation and function symbols, and so these symbols will be used without comment.
Let S and * S be a pair of ground sets, and let * : V(S) → V( * S) be a map between their superstructures that preserves rank. Relative to this map, an element a ∈ V( * S) is internal when there exists b ∈ V(S) such that a ∈ * b, and a is said to be external otherwise. The language of V( * S) is almost the same as L except that we enlarge the set of constants to include every element in V( * S). We denote the language of V( * (S)) by L (V( * S)). If φ (x 1 , . . ., x n ) is a formula in L (V(S)) with free variables x 1 , . . ., x n , then the * -transfer of φ is the formula in L (V( * S)) obtained by changing every constant a to * a. Clearly, every constant in * φ (x 1 , . . . , x n ) is internal.
Let κ be an uncountable cardinal number. A κ-saturated nonstandard extension of a superstructure V(S) is a set * S and a map * : V(S) → V( * S) satisfying:
• extension: * S is a superset of S and * s = s for all s ∈ S.
• transfer: For every sentence φ in L (V(S)), φ holds in V(S) if and only if its * -transfer * φ holds in V( * S).
• κ-saturation: For every family F = {A i : i ∈ I} of internal sets indexed by a set I of cardinality less than κ, if F has the finite intersection property, i.e., if every finite intersection of elements in F is nonempty, then the total intersection of F is nonempty. From this point on, we shall always assume that our nonstandard extension is at least ℵ 1 saturated.
It is easy to see that every element of * S is internal. It is also clear that A ⊂ * S is internal if and only if A ∈ * P(S). Most sets are external subsets of * S, and external subsets play an important role. The main tool for constructing internal sets is the internal definition principle: LEMMA A.3 (Internal Definition Principle). Let φ (x) be a formula in the language L (V( * S)) with free variable x. Suppose that all constants that occurs in φ are internal, then {x ∈ V( * S) : φ (x) holds in V( * S)} is internal in V( * S).
Saturation can be equivalently expressed in terms of the satisfiability of families of formulas. The role of the finite intersection property is played by finite satisfiability: DEFINITION A.4. Let J be an index set and let A ⊆ V( * S). A set of formulas
) is said to be finitely satisfiable in A when, for every finite subset α ⊂ J, there exists c ∈ A such that φ j (c) holds in V( * S) for all j ∈ α.
We provide the following alternative expression of κ-saturation: A.1. The hyperreals. Take S = R. Then any nonstandard extension * R is a superset of R and * x = x for x ∈ R. For every n ∈ N, let A n = {x ∈ R : 0 < x < 1 n }. Then * A n is internal by definition and, by the transfer principle, we have that * A n = {x ∈ * R : 0 * < x * < 1 n }, which is clearly seen to be internal by the internal definition principle. (For standard functions-like addition and multiplication-and relations-like the less-than relation-we will drop the * when the context is clear.)
Let F = { * A n : n ∈ N}. Clearly, F has the finite intersection property, which can be seen to hold by transfer, because each A n is nonempty and A n ⊇ A n+1 . By the saturation principle, the total intersection of F is nonempty. Therefore, there exists x ∈ * R such that 0 < x < 1 n for all n ∈ N. Such a number is called an infinitesimal. It follows that there exists y ∈ * R such that y > n for all n ∈ N. Such a number is called an infinite number. It follows that * R is a proper superset of R.
Write x ≈ y if |x − y| is infinitesimal and write µ(x) = {y ∈ * R : x ≈ y} for the monad of x. An element x ∈ * R is near-standard if x ≈ a for some a ∈ R. An element x ∈ * R is finite if |x| is bounded by some standard real number a. By the compactness of closed intervals of R and the transfer principle, one can show that an element x ∈ * R is finite if and only if x is near-standard.
It is also straightforward to show that, if x ∈ * R is near-standard, then there exists a unique real a ∈ R, called the standard part of x, such that x ≈ a. Let NS( * R) denote the collection of all near-standard points in * R, and let st : NS( * R) → R denote the standard part map taking a near-standard point x to its standard part. For a nearstandard real x, we will write • x instead of st(x); for a function f into NS( * R), we will write • f to denote the composition x → st( f (x)); for a set A ⊆ NS( * R), we will write st(A) to denote the set {x ∈ R : (∃a ∈ A) st(a) = x}; and, for a set B ⊆ R, we will write st −1 (B) to denote the inverse image {x ∈ * R : (∃b ∈ B) x ≈ b}. For a standard real x, the set st −1 (x) is the set of nonstandard numbers infinitesimally close to x, i.e., it is the monad µ(x) of x.
The following example is a classical example of external set: EXAMPLE A.6. Let φ be the sentence: ∀A ∈ P(R), if A is bounded above, then A has a least upper bound. 4 By the transfer principle, it holds that, for all A ∈ * P(R), i.e., all internal subsets of * R, if A is bounded above, then A has a least upper bound. Suppose the monad µ(0) is internal. Then there exists a 0 ∈ * R such that a 0 is a least upper bound for µ(0). Clearly a 0 > 0. Suppose a 0 ∈ µ(0). Then 2a 0 ∈ µ(0) and 2a 0 > a 0 , contradicting that a 0 is an upper bound, hence a 0 ∈ µ(0). The following lemma collects together two simple facts we use repeatedly: LEMMA A.7. Let a, b ∈ NS( * R).
a ≈ b if and only if
We conclude this section by introducing two useful properties derived from saturation: A.2. Nonstandard extensions of more general spaces. The concepts from the previous section can be generalized to a general metric space X by replacing the standard metric in R by the corresponding metric in the metric space. Indeed, all the concepts can be defined for an arbitrary topological space (X , T ). In this case, we will assume that our model is more saturated than the cardinality of T . The monadic structure is determined by T (although we will elide the topology in our notation as it will be clear from context). In particular, for x ∈ * X, the monad of x is defined by µ(x) = { * G : x ∈ G ∈ T }. In general µ(x) is external, however, for every x ∈ * X, one can use saturation to prove that there exists an (internal) * open set B ∈ * T such that x ∈ B ⊆ µ(x). Given a set Y ⊆ * X, the near-standard points are given by NS(Y ) = {y ∈ Y : (∃x ∈ X ) y ∈ µ(x)}. In general, NS( * X) is a proper subset of * X. However, when X is compact, we have NS( * X ) = * X . Indeed, this is the nonstandard way to characterize a compact space. PROOF OF LEMMA 6.7. Let x 1 , x 2 be two near-standard points in * D such that
. Then x 0 ∈ D. By local compactness, there exists a compact neighborhood K 0 of f (x 0 ). Let U 0 ⊆ K 0 be an open set containing the point f (x 0 ). It is clear that x 1 , x 2 are elements of * ( f −1 (U 0 )) hence * f (x 1 ) and * f (x 2 ) are elements of * K 0 by transfer. As K 0 is compact, both * f (x 1 ) and * f (x 2 ) are nearstandard.
Suppose
A.2.1. Vector spaces. We conclude this section with a short discussion of vector spaces over the nonstandard field * R. The notions of convexity of sets and functions have their ordinary abstract semantics: If X is a vector space over the field * R (where addition and multiplication are the nonstandard extensions of ordinary addition and multiplication), a (possibly external) subset A of X is convex if for all a ∈ * [0, 1] and x 1 , x 2 ∈ A, we have ax 1 + (1 − a)x 2 ∈ A. A (possibly external) function f from X to * R is convex if its graph is a convex set, i.e., for all a ∈ * [0, 1] and
The function is strictly convex if the inequality is strict. We will make use of several properties that hold when X is an internal set, i.e., when X is an internal vector space (over the field * R). By transfer, the first order characterization of internal vector spaces over * R is the same as that of standard vector spaces over R. An important class of internal convex spaces are the hyperfinite-dimensional Euclidean spaces I( * R N ) for N ∈ * N.
THEOREM A.12. I( * R N ) is an internal convex space for every N ∈ * N.
PROOF. Fix any N ∈ * N. For every n ∈ N, let F n denote the set of functions from {1, . . ., n} to R. Then I( * R N ) ∈ * n∈N F n hence I( * R N ) is internal. It is straightforward to demonstrate convexity.
We close with a proof of the hyperfinite separating hyperplane theorem, which demonstrates the use of transfer.
PROOF OF THEOREM 5.15. We first restate the standard hyperplane separation theorem. We shall view the set R N as the set of functions from N to R. For every element x ∈ R N , we use x(k) to denote the value of the k-th coordinate of x for any k ∈ N. The standard hyperplane separation theorem is equivalent to:
By the transfer principle, we know that * (R N ) denotes the set of all internal functions from * N to * R. We shall view the inner product ·, · to be a function from
Thus the nonstandard extension of ·, · is a function from * (R N ) × * (R N ) to * R satisfying the same property.
Now by the transfer principle we know that:
For any two disjoint convex sets S 1 , S 2 ∈ * P(R N ). If ∃K ∈ * N such that ∀s ∈ S 1 ∪ S 2 ∀K ′ > K we have s(K ′ ) = 0 then ∃W ∈ * (R N ) \ {0} such that for all p 1 ∈ S 1 , p 2 ∈ S 2 we have ((
. In this sentence, it is easy to see that we can view the projections of S 1 , S 2 as internal subsets of I( * R K ) and the projection of W as an element from I( * R K ) \ {0}. Hence we have that: ∀K ∈ * N, if S 1 , S 2 are two disjoint internal convex subsets of I( * R K ), then there exists W ∈ I( * R K ) \ {0} such that for any P 1 ∈ S 1 and any
Thus we have the desired result.
B: INTERNAL PROBABILITY THEORY
In this section, we give a brief introduction to nonstandard probability theory. The interested reader can consult [1] and [14] for more details.
Consider a σ -algebra F on a space X , and the space M 1 (X , F ) of countably additive probability measures defined on (X , F ). By the transfer principle, * (X , F ) and the set * M 1 (X , F ) of internal * countably additive probability measures on * F satisfy (the transfer of) all the first-order properties of their standard counterparts. Some care is required: e.g., * countably additivity is defined by the behavior of a measure on internal sequences in * F , not arbitrary sequences. In general, the transfer principle is the primary means of relating internal integration/measure theory to its standard counterpart. Saturation can then be used to control the effect of "small" perturbations.
As an example of using transfer, consider one of the key structures in this paper: that of an indexed family of probability measures on a common measurable space (X , F ). Let Θ be an index set, and, for every θ ∈ Θ, let P θ be a probability measure on (X , F ). Equivalently, we can think of P as a function P : Θ × F → [0, 1] defined by P(θ , A) = P θ (A) for A ∈ F . By the transfer principle, we know that * P is then a function from * Θ × * F to * [0, 1] and * P(y, ·) is an internal ( * countably additive) probability measure on ( * X, * F ) for every y ∈ * Θ. Note that, for each θ ∈ Θ, we can also take the nonstandard extension of the probability measure P θ . These two different nonstandard extensions agree with each other for θ ∈ Θ.
LEMMA B.1. For every θ ∈ Θ and A ∈ * F , * P(θ , A) = * (P θ )(A).
PROOF. Fix any θ 0 ∈ Θ and define F to be a function from F to [0, 1] by F(B) = P(θ 0 , B). Thus * F is an internal function from * F to * [0, 1] given by * P(θ 0 , A) for all A ∈ * F . Consider the sentence (∀B ∈ F )(F(B) = P θ 0 (B)). By the transfer principle, we have (∀A ∈ * F )( * F(A) = * (P θ 0 )(A)). As our choice of θ 0 is arbitrary, we have * P(θ , A) = * P θ (A) for every θ ∈ Θ and A ∈ * F . Thus, for every y ∈ * Θ, we shall write * P y (·) for * P(y, ·) and keep in mind that we can view * P y as the y-th fibre of a function of two variables. The next lemma also follows from a transfer (and extension) argument. LEMMA B.2. Let (X , F ) be a measurable space, let {P y } y∈Y be a family of probability measures on (X , F ), and suppose F is F -measurable and P y -integrable for all y ∈ Y . Define r(y) = X F(x)P y (dx) for y ∈ Y . Then * F is * F - * measurable and * P y - * integrable for all y ∈ * Y , * r(y) = * * X * F(x) * P y (dx) (B.1) for all y ∈ * Y , and r(y) = ( * r)(y) for every y ∈ Y .
We will simply write for * , integrable for * integrable, etc., when the context is clear. Saturation and transfer allow us to study the effects of "small" perturbations: LEMMA B.3. Let (X , F , P) be an internal probability space and let F, F ′ be internal P-integrable functions such that F ≈ F ′ everywhere. Then FdP ≈ F ′ dP.
B.1. Hyperfinitely additive probability measures and Loeb theory. Due to saturation, the subset of internal * finitely additive probability measures defined on internal algebras plays a central role in nonstandard probability theory. We can understand * finite (also called hyperfinite) structures by the transfer principle. In particular, a set A ∈ V( * S) is hyperfinite if and only if there exists an internal bijection between A and {1, 2, . . ., N} for some N ∈ * N. If such a number, N, exists, then it is unique and called the internal cardinality of A.
By definition, hyperfinite sets are themselves internal (otherwise the bijection would not be internal). By transfer, hyperfinite sets are well behaved like their standard finite counterparts: e.g., hyperfinite sums and products are always convergent. Internal subsets of hyperfinite sets are hyperfinite. The converse holds as well: a subset of a hyperfinite set is internal if and only if it is hyperfinite [1, Exercise 1.6.17].
The following definitions align with the transfer principle: An internal algebra F ⊂ P(X ) is an internal set containing X and closed under complementation and hyperfinite unions/intersections. A set function P : F → * R is hyperfinitely additive when, for every n ∈ * N and pairwise disjoint family A 1 , . . ., A n ∈ F , we have P( i≤n A i ) = ∑ i≤n P(A i ). An internal (hyperfinitely additive) probability space is a triple (Ω, F , P) composed of an internal set Ω; an internal subalgebra F ⊂ P(Ω); and an internal hyperfinitely additive probability measure P : F → * [0, 1] on (Ω, F ), i.e., a nonnegative hyperfinitely additive internal function such that P(Ω) = 1 and P( / 0) = 0. A hyperfinite probability space is an internal probability space (Ω, F , P) such that Ω is a hyperfinite set and F = I [Ω], where I [Ω] denotes the collection of all internal subsets of Ω. Like finite probability space, we can specify an internal probability measure on I [Ω] by defining the mass of each ω ∈ Ω.
One of the key theorems in modern nonstandard measure theory is due to Loeb [18] , who showed that any internal probability space can be extended to a standard σ -additive probability space.
THEOREM B.4 ([18] ). Let (Ω, F , P) be an internal finitely additive probability space. Then there is a standard σ -additive probability space (Ω, F P , P) such that:
1. F = F P is a σ -algebra with F ⊂ F ⊂ P(Ω). The probability triple (Ω, F , P) is called the Loeb space of (Ω, F , P). The σ -algebra F and the probability measure P are called the Loeb extensions of F and P, respectively. From Loeb's original proof, we can give the explicit form of F and P:
P(A)
The next example demonstrates that F may contain external sets. . Define P on F by P({ω}) = δt for all ω ∈ Ω. Then (Ω, F , P) is a hyperfinite probability space. Let (Ω, F , P) be the corresponding Loeb space, known as the uniform hyperfinite Loeb space. CLAIM B.6. µ(0) ∩ Ω ∈ F .
PROOF. µ(0) ∩ Ω consists of elements from Ω that are infinitesimally close to 0. For n ∈ N, let A n = {ω ∈ Ω : ω ≤ 1 n }, which is internal by the internal definition principle. Thus A n ∈ F and F ∋ n∈N A n = µ(0) ∩ Ω, completing the proof.
Note that µ(0) ∩ Ω is an external set. This shows that F contains external sets. In fact, letting ν denote Lebesgue measure, one can show that, for every set A ⊆ [0, 1] that is ν-measurable, st −1 (A) ∩ Ω ∈ F and ν(A) = P(st −1 (A) ∩ Ω). Thus (Ω, F , P) is a "hyperfinite representation" of Lebesgue measure on [0, 1]. From Loeb's proof, we know that F P is the P-completion of the σ -algebra generated by F . This suggests that F P will depend on P. However, some sets always appear in the Loeb σ -algebra: DEFINITION B.7. A set A ⊂ Ω is called universally Loeb measurable if A ∈ F P for every internal probability measure P on (Ω, F ).
We denote the collection of all universally Loeb measurable sets on an internal algebra F by L u (F ). The following theorem characterizes the universal Loeb measurability of the set of near-standard points and Borel sets under sufficient regularity conditions: 
